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This paper will consider the principle grounds on which the validity of 
selection patents are attacked, namely anticipation, obviousness, double 
patenting, lack of utility and insufficiency, with a view to exploring the 
doctrinal underpinnings for challenging a selection patent as an “improper 
selection”. As will be discussed further below, “improper selection” 
comfortably fits within existing grounds of invalidity and, in particular, 





A definition of a selection patent was provided by Rothstein J., 
speaking for the Court, in the recent Supreme Court decision of 
Sanofi-Synthelabo Canada Inc. v. Apotex Inc.1: 
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In the context of chemical compounds, in general terms, a 
selection patent is one whose subject matter (compounds) is 
a fraction of a larger known class of compounds which was 
the subject matter of a prior patent.2  
 
Rothstein J. referred to the following three criteria from In 
Re: I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G.‟s Patents3 as the locus classicus of 
selection patents:  
 
1. There must be a substantial advantage to be secured or 
disadvantage to be avoided by the use of the selected 
members.  
2. The whole of the selected members (subject to "a few 
exceptions here and there") possess the advantage in 
question.  
3. The selection must be in respect of a quality of a special 
character peculiar to the selected group. If further research 
revealed a small number of unselected compounds 
possessing the same advantage, that would not invalidate 
the selection patent. However, if research showed that a 
larger number of unselected compounds possessed the same 
advantage, the quality of the compound claimed in the 
selection patent would not be of a special character.4  
 
While these principles appear to have informed the Court‟s 
analysis, Rothstein J. examined the validity of the patent-in-suit with 
regard to the principles of anticipation, obviousness, and double-
patenting. The “special advantages” of the claimed compound were 
examined in connection with these inquiries and not as a stand-alone 
ground of patentability.  
A valid selection may be “from a class of thousands or for a 
selection of one out of two”.5  
                                                          
2 Ibid at 254-255.  
3 (1930), 47 R.P.C. 289 (Ch.D.) [I.G. Farbenindustrie]. 
4 Sanofi-Synthelabo, supra note 1 at 257.  
5 See e.g. Pfizer Canada Inc. v. Canada (Minister of Health) (2006), 52 CPR (4th) 241, 




Selection patents “exist to encourage researchers to further use 
their inventive skills so as to discover new advantages for compounds 
within the known class.”6  
Selection patents are subject generally to the same rules that 




Not surprisingly, many selection patents are directed to 
pharmaceuticals. In Canada, there is a regulatory regime specific to 
pharmaceuticals that links the patent system with the regulatory 
approval system. Some key features of this system are explained here 
in order to provide context for the case law discussion that follows.  
Before a drug product can be marketed in Canada, 
authorization must be obtained from the Minister of Health. Upon 
achieving regulatory approval, the Minister issues a Drug 
Identification Number or DIN and a Notice of Compliance (“NOC”). 
The Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations8 require 
the Minister of Health to maintain a register of patents pertaining to 
medicines for which Notices of Compliance have been issued (the 
“Patent Register”).9 The owner or licensee of a patent for a medicine 
who files a drug submission can seek to add the relevant patent(s) to 
the Patent Register by filing a patent list.10 If a second or subsequent 
entry drug manufacturer seeks a NOC in respect of a drug and in 
doing so directly or indirectly compares the drug with a drug on the 
Patent Register, with respect to each patent referenced on the Patent 
Register, the second or subsequent entry drug manufacturer must file 
a statement of acceptance that the NOC will not issue until the patent 
expires or an allegation that: the person appearing on the patent list is 
                                                                                                                                  
Farbenindustrie and E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Akzo NV [1982] F.S.R. 303 
(HL).  
6 See e.g. Pfizer Canada Inc. v. Canada (Minister of Health), supra note 5 at 244.  
7 See e.g. GlaxoSmithKline Inc. et al. and Pharmascience Inc. et al. (2008), 72 CPR 
(4th) 295 (FCTD) at 318 [GlaxoSmithKline], and Sanofi-Synthelabo, supra note 1 at 
282.   
8 SOR/93-133 as amended.  
9 Ibid. s.3(2).  




not the patentee or a person claiming under the patentee; the patent 
has expired; the patent is not valid; or the patent is not infringed.11 
Within 45 days of service of this “Notice of Allegation”, the patentee 
or licensee can bring an application in the Federal Court for an order 
prohibiting the Minister from issuing a NOC until after the patent 
expires.12 This application is associated with a 24-month stay during 
which the Minister is prohibited from issuing a NOC to the second or 
subsequent entry drug manufacturer.13 While named in the style of 
cause, the Minister does not participate in the hearings of these 
applications. In disposing of the application, the Court may make an 
order prohibiting the Minister from issuing a NOC until after the 
expiration of the patent(s) that are the subject of the application, if it 
finds that none of the allegations at issue in the proceeding are 
justified or dismiss the application for a prohibition order if it finds 
that an allegation is justified.14 Notwithstanding the outcome of these 
proceedings, the patentee or licensee can sue the second or 
subsequent entry drug manufacturer for patent infringement. It 
should be noted that due to their summary nature, decisions arising 
out of prohibition proceedings have limited precedential value in 
terms of their pronouncements on patent law:   
 
NOC proceedings were never intended to be substitutes for 
an infringement action…Similarly, it is inappropriate to 
rely on NOC proceedings to set binding precedent on 
controversial and uncertain questions in patent law 




A patent is to be granted for an “invention” defined by the 
Patent Act16 as “any new and useful art, process, machine, 
                                                          
11 Ibid. s.5.  
12 Ibid. s.6(1).  
13 Ibid. s.7(1)(e).  
14 Ibid. s.6(2).  
15 Eli Lilly Canada Inc. v. Novopharm Ltd. (2007), 62 CPR (4th) 161 at 176, leave to 
appeal refused [2008] S.C.C.A. No. 9.  




manufacture or composition of matter” or improvement thereof.17 
Section 28.2 of the current Act provides a specific framework for 
assessing the novelty of a Canadian patent.  
The test for anticipation has been given various formulations. 
One frequently cited formulation of the test is that provided by 
Hugessen J.A. speaking for the Federal Court of Appeal in the decision 
of Beloit Canada Ltd. et al. v. Valmet Oy18:   
 
One must, in effect, be able to look at a prior, single 
publication and find in it all the information which, for 
practical purposes, is needed to produce the claimed 
invention without the exercise of any inventive skill. The 
prior publication must contain so clear a direction that a 
skilled person reading and following it would in every case 




ANTICIPATION AND SELECTION PATENTS 
In Sanofi-Synthelabo, Sanofi sought an order prohibiting the 
Minister of Health from issuing a NOC to Apotex in respect of 
clopidogrel bisulfate, marketed by Sanofi as PLAVIX. Sanofi held two 
Canadian patents: the genus patent 1,194,875 (the “875 Patent”) 
which disclosed more than 250,000 possible compounds and patent 
1,336,777 (the “777 Patent”), which disclosed and claimed clopidogrel 
bisulfate, the dextro-rotary isomer of a racemate made and tested in 
the 875 Patent. Apotex alleged invalidity on the grounds of 
anticipation, obviousness and double patenting. The Applications 
Judge did not find the allegations to be justified and granted the order 
of prohibition.20 The Federal Court of Appeal dismissed Apotex‟s 
appeal.21 The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal.  
Accepting that selection patents were permitted in principle, 
Rothstein J. speaking for the Supreme Court considered the question 
                                                          
17 Ibid. s.2 (emphasis added).  
18 (1986) 8 CPR (3d) 289 (FCA) [Beloit].  
19 Ibid. at 297.  
20 (2005), 39 CPR (4th) 202 (FCTD).  




of anticipation in the context of selection patents.22 He found that the 
Applications Judge “overstated the stringency of the test for 
anticipation that the “exact invention” has already been made and 
publicly disclosed”23 and went on to formulate a two-part test for 
anticipation:  
 
When considering the role of the person skilled in the art in 
respect of disclosure, the skilled person is "taken to be 
trying to understand what the author of the description [in 
the prior patent] meant"…At this stage, there is no room for 
trial and error or experimentation by the skilled person. He 
is simply reading the prior patent for the purposes of 
understanding it. 
If the disclosure requirement is satisfied, the 
second requirement to prove anticipation is "enablement" 
which means that the person skilled in the art would have 
been able to perform the invention [.]24 
 
Trial and error experimentation is permitted at the second 
stage, but not at the initial disclosure stage:  
 
Once the subject matter of the invention is disclosed by the 
prior patent, the person skilled in the art is assumed to be 
willing to make trial and error experiments to get it to 
work. While trial and error experimentation is permitted at 
the enablement stage, it is not at the disclosure stage. For 
purposes of enablement, the question is no longer what the 
skilled person would think the disclosure of the prior patent 
meant, but whether he or she would be able to work the 
invention.25  
 
While permitted at the second stage, experimentation must be 
such that can be performed without undue burden.26   
                                                          
22 Sanofi-Synthelabo, supra note 1 at 259-260.  
23 Ibid. at 261.  
24 Ibid. at 261.  
25 Ibid. at 262.  




Rothstein J. identified this two-part approach as a refinement 
of the Beloit test for anticipation:  
 
The Beloit decision by which the applications judge rightly 
felt bound dealt with only one aspect of anticipation, that is, 
whether or not the invention in a patent had been disclosed 
in a single prior publication or patent. In that decision, 
Hugessen J.A. held that it had not. He had no need to 
consider the further point whether or not, had there been 
such a clear disclosure, the working of the invention was 
also enabled by that disclosure. That point was not in issue 
in Beloit. Explicitly separating disclosure and enablement is 
a refinement of the approach set out in Beloit.27  
 
Rothstein J. went on to consider what must be disclosed by 
the prior art genus patent to constitute anticipation:  
 
In the context of genus and selection patents, in E.I. Du 
Pont de Nemours & Co. (Witsiepe‟s) Application, [1982] 
F.S.R. 303 (H.L.), Lord Wilberforce stated, at p. 311:  
It is the absence of the discovery of the special 
advantages, as well as the fact of non-making, that makes it 
possible for such persons to make an invention related to a 
member of the class.  
The compound made for the selection patent was 
only soundly predicted at the time of the genus patent. It 
was not made and its special advantages were not known. It 
is for those reasons that a patent should not be denied to the 
inventor who made and discovered the special advantages 
of the selection compound for the first time.  
In the context of disclosure as explained in 
Synthon, "the absence of the discovery of the special 
advantages" to which Lord Wilberforce was referring in 
Witsiepe's means that the genus patent does not disclose the 
special advantages of the invention covered by the selection 
patent. Where there is no such disclosure, there is no 
discovery of the special advantages of the selection patent as 
compared to the genus patent, and the disclosure 
                                                          




requirement to prove anticipation fails. At this stage, the 
person skilled in the art is reading the prior patent to 
understand whether it discloses the special advantages of 
the second invention. No trial and error is permitted. If in 
reading the genus patent the special advantages of the 
invention of the selection patent are not disclosed, the 
genus patent does not anticipate the selection patent. 
[Emphasis added]28 
 
Rothstein J. found no anticipation on the basis that the prior 
art genus patent did not amount to disclosure so as to satisfy the first 
stage of the anticipation test.  
Accordingly, in the case of a true selection, i.e. one where the 
selected compound has not been made nor its advantage(s) disclosed 
in the prior art, there will be no anticipation because the first part of 
the two-part test for anticipation (disclosure) will not be satisfied.  
In the recent decision of Lundbeck Canada Inc. v. Canada 
(Minister of Health) 29, Harrington J. granted an order of prohibition 
preventing the Minister of Health from issuing a NOC to Genpharm, 
Apotex and Cobalt in respect of a generic version of Lundbeck‟s 
escitalopram drug until the expiry of Canadian Patent No. 1,339,452 
(“452 Patent”). While three separate proceedings were brought against 
the generic companies, the proceedings were heard consecutively and 
the Court issued one decision.  All three generic companies alleged 
the 452 Patent was an invalid selection patent from one or more 
issued U.S. Patents.  The U.S. Patents claimed citalopram, a racemate, 
while the 452 Patent claimed escitalopram, the S-enantiomer of 
citalopram.  The Court found that the 452 Patent was not a selection 
patent on the basis that the prior genus patents did not disclose 
escitalopram, so the 452 Patent did not need to meet the requirements 
of a selection patent.  The Court noted that if it had determined that 
the 452 Patent was a selection patent, it would have been invalid for 
not satisfying the requirements of a selection patent.  Accordingly, an 
available defence to an allegation of improper selection may be that 
the prior patent does not cover the claimed selection even in a generic 
way.  
                                                          
28 Ibid. at 263.  







Historically the requirement for inventiveness (or “lack of 
obviousness”) was a judge-made requirement derived from the 
requirement that patents be granted for “inventions”.30 The 
requirement that an invention must not be obvious is now a statutory 
requirement under section 28.3 of the Act.  
A commonly cited test for obviousness is that provided by 
Hugessen J.A. in Beloit:  
 
The test for obviousness is not to ask what competent 
inventors did or would have done to solve the problem. 
Inventors are by definition inventive. The classical 
touchstone for obviousness is the technician skilled in the 
art but having no scintilla of inventiveness or imagination; a 
paragon of deduction and dexterity, wholly devoid of 
intuition; a triumph of the left hemisphere over the right. 
The question to be asked is whether this mythical creature 
(the man in the Clapham omnibus of patent law) would, in 
the light of the state of the art and the common general 
knowledge as at the claimed date of invention, have come 
directly and without difficulty to the solution taught by the 
patent. It is a very difficult test to satisfy.31  
 
VI 
OBVIOUSNESS AND SELECTION PATENTS 
The Beloit test for obviousness was revisited by the Supreme 
Court in Sanofi-Synthelabo. The Court considered whether the 
“obvious to try” standard was part of Canadian law. Looking to the 
law in foreign jurisdictions, the Court decided the obviousness 
standard should be reconsidered in Canada and, in particular, the 
restrictiveness with which the Beloit test had been interpreted.32   
                                                          
30See e.g. Hughes and Woodley on Patents (Loose-Leaf), 2008 LexisNexis Canada Inc. 
[Hughes & Woodley] at §12.   
31 Beloit, supra note 18 at 294.  




The Court held that the “obvious to try” test could be 
considered, but it “must be approached cautiously” and is “only one 
factor to assist in the obviousness inquiry”.33 Rothstein J. formulated 
the test thus:  
 
I am of the opinion that the "obvious to try" test will work 
only where it is very plain or, to use the words of Jacob L.J., 
more or less self-evident that what is being tested ought to 
work.  
For a finding that an invention was "obvious to try", there 
must be evidence to convince a judge on a balance of 
probabilities that it was more or less self-evident to try to 
obtain the invention. Mere possibility that something might 
turn up is not enough.34  
 
Rothstein J. went on to adopt the four-step obviousness 
inquiry outlined by Oliver L.J. in Windsurfing International Inc. v. 
Tabur Marine (Great Britain) Ltd.35, as updated by Jacob L.J. in Pozzoli 
SPA v. BDMO SA36,:  
 
In the result I would restate the Windsurfing questions 
thus:  
(1) (a) Identify the notional "person skilled in the art";  
(1) (b) Identify the relevant common general knowledge of 
that person;  
(2) Identify the inventive concept of the claim in question 
or if that cannot readily be done, construe it;  
(3) Identify what, if any, differences exist between the 
matter cited as forming part of the "state of the art" and the 
inventive concept of the claim or the claim as construed;  
(4) Viewed without any knowledge of the alleged invention 
as claimed, do those differences constitute steps which 
would have been obvious to the person skilled in the art or 
                                                          
33 Ibid. at 271. 
34 Ibid. at 271-272.  
35 [1985] R.P.R. 59 (C.A.). 




do they require any degree of invention? [Emphasis 
added]37 
 
Rothstein J. identified the fourth step as being where the issue 
of “obvious to try” will arise and identified a list of non-exhaustive 
factors that should be considered in this step of the inquiry.38,39   
In applying the four-step obviousness analysis, Rothstein J. 
looked to the specification of the 777 Patent to find the “inventive 
concept”: 
 
The inventive concept of the claims is not readily 
discernable from the claims themselves. A bare chemical 
formula in a patent claim may not be sufficient to 
determine its inventiveness. In such cases, I think it must be 
acceptable to read the specification in the patent to 
determine the inventive concept of the claims. Of course, it 
is not permissible to read the specification in order to 
construe the claims more narrowly or widely than the text 
will allow. 
In the present case, it is apparent that the inventive 
concept of the claims in the „777 patent is a compound 
useful in inhibiting platelet aggregation which has greater 
therapeutic effect and less toxicity than the other 
compounds of the „875 patent and the methods for 
obtaining that compound.[Emphasis added]40  
                                                          
37 Sanofi-Synthelabo, supra note 1 at 272.  
38 Ibid. at 273.  
39 The “obvious to try” standard as formulated by Rothstein J. was recently explained 
in the Federal Court of Appeal decision of Apotex Inc. v. Pfizer Canada Inc. and Pfizer 
Ireland Pharmaceuticals and The Minister of Health (2009), 72 CPR (4th) 141. In this 
case, the appellant argued that the Court in Sanofi-Synthelabo had incorporated a 
“worth a try” test into Canadian law. Noel J. speaking for the Court characterized the 
test adopted by the Supreme Court as “a precise application of the test loosely referred 
to as „worth a try‟”:  
The test recognized is “obvious to try” where the word “obvious” 
means “very plain”. According to this test, an invention is not 
made obvious because the prior art would have alerted the person 
skilled in the art to the possibility that something might be worth 
trying. The invention must be more or less self-evident. (at paras. 
28-29). 





Accordingly, in selection patents the inventive concept of the 
claim (that which renders it inventive) is the advantage of the 
selection over the genus, which may be found with reference to the 
description. A proper selection, i.e. one with an actual and discernible 




The rationale for the prohibition against double patenting was 
outlined by Binnie J. speaking for the Supreme Court in the decision 
of Whirlpool Corp. v. Camco Inc.41:  
 
It is common ground that the bargain between the patentee 
and the public is in the interest of both sides only if the 
patent owner acquires real protection in exchange for 
disclosure, and the public does not for its part surrender a 
more extended monopoly than the statutory 17 years from 
the date of the patent grant (now 20 years from the date of 
the filing of the patent application). A patentee who can 
"evergreen" a single invention through successive patents by 
the expedient of obvious or uninventive additions prolongs 
its monopoly beyond what the public has agreed to pay.42  
 
In considering a double patenting objection, it is the claims of 
the two patents that are compared.  
 
The prohibition against double patenting relates back to the 
"evergreen" problem mentioned at the outset. The inventor 
is only entitled to "a" patent for each invention: Patent Act, 
s. 36(1).43 If a subsequent patent issues with identical claims, 
there is an improper extension of the monopoly. It is clear 
that the prohibition against double patenting involves a 
                                                          
41 (2000), 9 CPR (4th) 129 (SCC) [Whirlpool].  
42 Ibid. at 144.   
43 Subsection 36(1) of the Act provides: “A patent shall be granted for one invention 
only but in an action or other proceeding a patent shall not be deemed to be invalid 




comparison of the claims rather than the disclosure, because 
it is the claims that define the monopoly. The question is 
how "identical" must be the claims in the subsequent patent 
to justify invalidation.44  
 
In Whirlpool, Binnie J. identified two branches of double 
patenting: coterminous and obviousness-type. Binnie J. pointed to the 
decision of Beecham Canada Ltd. v. Procter & Gamble Co.45 where the 
Federal Court of Appeal adopted the "identical or coterminous" 
standard and then distinguished this branch from the broader 
obviousness-type double patenting:  
 
There is, however, a second branch of the prohibition 
which is sometimes called "obviousness" double patenting. 
This is a more flexible and less literal test that prohibits the 
issuance of a second patent with claims that are not 
"patentably distinct" from those of the earlier patent. …  
In Consolboard…Dickson J. referred to Farbwerke 
Hoechst as "the main authority on double patenting" … 
which stood for the proposition that a second patent could 
not be justified unless the claims exhibited "novelty or 
ingenuity" over the first patent…46 
 
VIII 
DOUBLE PATENTING AND SELECTION PATENTS 
Given the nature of selection patents, it is not surprising that 
double patenting is frequently raised as a ground of invalidity. In 
Sanofi-Synthelabo, Rothstein J. rejected the proposition that a general 
concern about evergreening justified an attack on the doctrine of 
selection patents, giving two reasons:  
 
First, a selection patent may be sought by a party other than 
the inventor or owner of the original genus patent. In such 
                                                          
44 Whirlpool, supra note 41 at 157.  
45 (1982), 61 C.P.R. (2d) 1 (FCA). 




a case, anticipation or obviousness may be an issue, but 
evergreening does not arise.47  
… 
Second and more importantly, selection patents 
encourage improvements by selection. The inventor selects 
only a bit of the subject matter of the original genus patent 
because that bit does something better than and different 
from what was claimed in the genus patent.48  
 
Rothstein J. went on to consider the 
Whirlpool decision: 
 
Apotex argues that the focus in a double patenting 
challenge is on the claims of the two patents rather than on 
the disclosure. I agree. In Whirlpool, Binnie J. stated, at 
para. 63:  
It is clear that the prohibition against double 
patenting involves a comparison of the claims rather than 
the disclosure, because it is the claims that define the 
monopoly.  
Whirlpool was not a selection patent case. 
However, because selection patents are to be subject to the 
same considerations as other patents, the clear statement of 
Binnie J. in Whirlpool must apply to selection patents.  
I agree with Apotex that a challenge to patent 
validity based on double patenting does not require the 
existence of identical language in the two patent claims. 
Even so, the wording of the claims, however different, must 
claim the same invention.  
The invention defined by claim 14 of the '875 
patent is not the same as the invention claimed by claim 1 
of the '777 patent because the former is broader than the 
latter. [Emphasis added]49  
 
In finding no double patenting, Rothstein J. 
explained the decision as follows:  
                                                          
47 Sanofi-Synthelabo, supra note 1 at 279.  
48 Ibid. at 280.  





A selection patent that claims a compound that is 
patentably distinct from the genus patent will not be invalid 
for obviousness double patenting. Here, out of the many 
compounds predicted to be effective as exhibiting platelet 
aggregation inhibiting activity in the '875 patent, it was 
found that the dextro-rotatory isomer of the racemate 
relevant in this case had beneficial properties over both the 
racemate and the levo-rotatory isomer. As I have explained 
above, the claims in the '777 patent reflect a patentably 
distinct compound from the compounds in the '875 patent. 
As a result, there is no basis for a challenge based on 
"obviousness" double patenting.  
While double patenting requires a comparison of 
the claims of a genus and selection patent, it is necessary 
that the specification of the selection patent define in clear 
terms the nature of the characteristic which the patentee 
alleges to be possessed by the selection for which he claims 
a monopoly. [Emphasis added]50  
 
Accordingly, where a claimed selection is novel and inventive 





Utility is required by the Act. A patent is to be granted for an 
“invention”: “any new and useful art, process, machine, manufacture 
or composition of matter” or improvement thereof.51  
In the Alsop‟s Patent case52, Parker J. recognized that there are 
two “types” of utility:  
 
[T]he well-known rule is that utility of an invention 
depends upon whether, by following the directions of the 
patentee, the result which the patentee professed to 
                                                          
50 Ibid. at 283-284.  
51 Act, supra note 16 at section 2 (emphasis added).  




produce can in fact be produced…Want of utility in this 
sense must however, in my opinion, be distinguished from 
want of utility in the sense of the invention being useless 
for any purpose whatever. In the case of an invention not 
serving any useful purpose at all, the Patent would no doubt 
be void, but not entirely for the same reason.53 
 
Utility does not have to be disclosed in the patent application, 
although how to use the invention must be disclosed.  Subsections 
27(3)(a) and (b) of the Act provide:  
 
Specification. - The specification of an invention must 
(a) correctly and fully describe the invention and its 
operation or use as contemplated by the inventor;  
(b) set out clearly the various steps in a process, or the 
method of constructing making, compounding or 
using a machine manufacture or composition of 
matter, in such full, clear, concise and exact terms as 
to enable any person skilled in the art or science to 
which it pertains, or with which it is most closely 
connected to make, construct, compound or use it;   
 
In Consolboard Inc. v. MacMillan Bloedel (Saskatchewan) 
Ltd.54, Dickson J. speaking for the Supreme Court considered s. 36(1), a 
precursor to s. 27(3) of the current Act:  
 
…the Federal Court of Appeal erred also in holding that s. 
36(1) requires distinct indication of the real utility of the 
invention in question. There is a helpful discussion in 29 
Hals., 3rd ed., p. 59, on the meaning of “not useful” in patent 
law. It means “that the invention will not work, either in 
the sense that it will not operate at all or, more broadly, that 
it will not do what the specification promises that it will 
do”. There is no suggestion here that the invention will not 
give the result promised. The discussion in Halsbury, ibid., 
continues:  
                                                          
53 Ibid. at 753.  




…the practical usefulness of the invention does not 
matter, nor does its commercial utility, unless the 
specification promises commercial utility, nor does it matter 
whether the invention is of any real benefit to the public, or 
particularly suitable for the purposes suggested. 
And concludes [at p. 60]: 
…it is sufficient utility to support a patent that the 
invention gives either a new article, or a better article, or a 
cheaper article, or affords the public a useful choice… 
Canadian law is to the same effect.55  
 
In the case of chemical patents, it is possible to satisfy the 
utility requirement for compounds that have not been made or tested 
through a doctrine of “sound prediction”. The doctrine of sound 
prediction has three components: there must be a factual basis for the 
prediction; the inventor must have at the date of the patent 
application an articulable and "sound" line of reasoning from which 
the desired result can be inferred from the factual basis; and there 
must be proper disclosure.56  
 
X 
UTILITY AND SELECTION PATENTS 
The issue of utility in the context of a selection patent was 
considered by the Federal Court of Appeal in the decision of Pfizer 
Canada Inc. v. Canada (Minister of Health)57 (referred to here as Pfizer 
v. Ratiopharm to distinguish it from other cases with Pfizer in the 
style of cause). This case involved a selection of besylate salt of 
amlodipine (claimed in patent 1,321,393 (the “393 Patent”)) marketed 
by Pfizer as NORVASC. The selection was from a class of eighty 
pharmaceutically acceptable salts of amlodipine disclosed in a prior 
genus patent. The genus patent indicated that the preferred salts were 
the maleates. The applicants found these unsuitable for formulation 
into a dosage form and sought a replacement salt having an optimal 
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56 Apotex Inc. v. Wellcome Foundation Ltd. (2002), 21 CPR (4th) 499 (SCC) at 526.  
57 (2006), 52 CPR (4th) 241 (FCA), leave to appeal refused [2006] S.C.C.A. No. 335 




combination of four formulation properties: solubility, stability, non-
hygroscopicity and non-stickiness.  
Ratiopharm alleged invalidity of the 393 Patent on the basis of 
anticipation, obviousness and being an improper selection patent. The 
Applications Judge found the patent to be an improper selection, 
concluding there was no disclosure of the advantage and that it was 
merely a non-patentable exercise in verifying the existing properties 
and testing the degree of known characteristics, based on the absence 
of explanation or justification for why certain salts from a known class 
were tested. The Applications Judge concluded that because the 
selection was not valid, the selection patent was invalid for 
obviousness-type double patenting and did not grant the order of 
prohibition.58  
Ratiopharm‟s Notice of Allegation, included an allegation that 
besylate offered no substantial or practically significant improvement 
in stability over any of the other salts tests in the 393  Patent. With 
respect to this allegation, the Applications Judge found the Notice of 
Allegation inadequate because it did not include the results of testing 
performed by a third party retained by Ratiopharm for that purpose.  
The Court of Appeal distinguished verification from empirical 
research for the purpose of making a selection from a class:  
 
The empirical investigation leading to an invention 
protected by a selection patent must involve "at the least the 
discovery that the selected members possess qualities 
hitherto undiscovered, particular to themselves and not 
attributable to them by virtue of the fact of their belonging 
to a class specified by an earlier invention"  
… 
On the other hand, verification means confirming 
predicted or predictable qualities of known compounds; i.e. 
components that have already been discovered and made. 
No one can claim a selection patent merely for ascertaining 
the properties of a known substance...[Citations omitted]59  
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In concluding the Applications Judge applied the wrong test, 
Malone J.A. for the Court of Appeal noted that the Applications Judge 
found that “the Formulation Properties of any salt of amlodipine 
could never have been expected but must be determined 
empirically”.60 Malone J.A. went on to find that had the Applications 
Judge applied the proper principles, he could only have concluded 
that the 393 Patent was a valid selection because “of  Pfizer‟s 
discovery of Besylate‟s special Formulation Properties creating a 
special advantage in dosage stability and processability”.61  
Under the heading “Special Advantage”, the Court 
characterized Ratiopharm‟s argument as follows:  
 
Ratiopharm urges that if Pfizer need only assert that the 
"unique combination" of Besylate's Formulation Properties 
cannot be predicted and therefore possess an unexpected 
advantage, then any amlodipine salt selected could be tested 
against any number of properties which could theoretically 
support a claim to "unique properties" that could not be 
predicted. They argue that this is absurd and that more 
disclosure details of selection of comparator salts, 
Formulation Properties and fully explained thresholds for 
acceptable results are essential to support Besylate's special 
advantage over the class.62  
 
In rejecting this argument, the Court turned to the statutory 
utility requirements:  
 
To meet the statutory requirement in subsection 34(1) of 
the Patent Act,63 …that a patent be "useful", the selected 
species must have an advantage over the class as a whole …  
However, there are no special legal requirements 
regarding what particular type of advantage is required. The 
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test for advantage is understood to include a disadvantage to 
be avoided, as is the case here …[Citations omitted]64  
 
The decision, however, left open the possibility of challenging 
the utility on the basis that thresholds could be manipulated, the 
Court of Appeal pointing out that there was little evidence on the 
issue of thresholds because Ratiopharm had not objected to them 
within the Notice of Allegation.  
In GlaxoSmithKline65, GlaxoSmithKline and the Wellcome 
Foundation (referred to here collectively as “GSK”) sought an order 
prohibiting the Minister from issuing a NOC to Pharmascience until 
the expiry of Canadian Patent 1,340,083 (the “083 Patent”). GSK 
asserted the 083 Patent as a valid selection patent from GSK‟s 
European Patent No. 0,099,493 (the “493 Patent”) that would be 
infringed if Pharmascience was permitted to produce the antiviral 
compound valacyclovir (marketed as VALTREX). Pharmascience 
alleged invalidity for anticipation, obviousness, non-utility, double 
patenting, lack of invention, insufficiency, disclosure, lack of sound 
prediction and improper selection. Barnes J. found that these grounds 
“overlapped” and it was not necessary to deal with them in a discrete 
way.66 Acyclovir was a known antiviral drug, which although given 
orally presented problems of bioavailability. Valacyclovir is a prodrug 
formed by the molecular combination of acyclovir with the amino 
acid, L-valine. Barnes J. identified the subject matter claimed by the 
493 Patent as a genus of aliphatic amino acid esters of acyclovir and 
the patent included a statement that the new ester compounds 
“surprisingly have an improved water solubility compared with 
acyclovir which enables the derivatives to be used to a greater extent 
than acyclovir in the formulation of aqueous preparations”.67 The 083 
Patent claimed the selection of the compound valacyclovir (the L-
valine ester of acyclovir) asserting that it “surprisingly had improved 
bioavailability after oral administration compared with alanine and 
glycine esters mentioned [in the 493 Patent]”68. Barnes J. found that 
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the bioavailability advantage asserted as the inventive selection of the 
083 Patent was neither anticipated nor obvious.  
Turning to the issue of utility, Barnes J. noted that “[t]o 
establish that a compound has a peculiar advantage over the genus of 
compounds from which it was chosen requires that the advantage not 
be found or be predicted to be found in a large number of members of 
the genus.”69 Barnes J. looked to the Federal Court of Appeal decision 
in Pfizer v. Ranbaxy (discussed further below) and found that Nadon 
J. indicated that evidence of an unexpected selection advantage over 
the compounds covered by the genus patent is a requirement, at least 
with respect to establishing utility.70 With respect to the utility of 
valacyclovir, Barnes J. found as follows:  
 
The utility of valacyclovir and the other esters of acyclovir 
as antiviral prodrugs has already been asserted in the 493 
Patent. The specific utility of valacyclovir had to be found, 
therefore, not in its antiviral properties or in improved 
solubility but in its supposedly better oral bioavailability 
profile over the other members of the class from which it 
was selected. That utility had to be established either by 
testing or by sound prediction or both. If the utility of 
valacyclovir for enhanced oral bioavailability over the 
genus compounds was not scientifically demonstrated or 
soundly predicted as of the Canadian filing date, the 083 
Patent must fail for lack of utility…The fact that later 
evidence may establish utility does not transform the earlier 
speculation into something inventive. [Emphasis added]71 
 
Barnes J. found that there must be sufficient testing of genus 
compounds to support at least a sound prediction of a substantially 
unique or peculiar advantage for the selection.72 Barnes J. found GSK‟s 
evidence with respect to surprising or unexpected bioavailability to be 
insufficient:  
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[T]here is no evidence produced by GSK to establish that 
that bioavailability advantage for valacyclovir asserted by 
the 083 Patent was then known or predicted to be 
substantially unique among the thousands of compounds 
claimed by the 493 Patent. For all I can tell from the 
evidence, valacyclovir was, at best, shown to have a 
qualitative bioavailability advantage over the other two 
esters tested but that finding says absolutely nothing about 
whether the same advantage would exist vis-à-vis a few, 
some, many, most or all of the other compounds claimed by 
the 493 Patent. This is hardly a sufficient basis to establish 
the legal requirement that a selection be of a special or 
peculiar character relative to the genus from which it was 
chosen…Another way of putting this is that the selection of 
one compound with an unquantified advantage over two 
others does not add anything of a substantial character to 
the existing knowledge relative to the substantial pool of 
other esters of acyclovir named by the 493 
Patent…[Citation omitted]73 
 
In holding the allegations of invalidity justified on the basis of 
lack of utility, Barnes J. found as follows:  
 
In a pharmaceutical selection patent, the invention is the 
discovery of a surprising or unexpected advantage of the 
selection over the genus of compounds from which it was 
chosen. The utility of such a selection is not found in the 
fact that it works to successfully treat some human 
condition or ailment but rather that it works surprisingly 
better than the compounds monopolized by the genus 
patent. That is the inventive promise and the inventive 
promise that must be established.74  
 
In light of the finding with respect to utility, Barnes J. found it 
unnecessary to consider the sufficiency of the disclosure under s. 
27(3), however, looking to the Federal Court of Appeal decision in 
Pfizer v. Ranbaxy, Barnes J. noted:  
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The law in the area of disclosure has recently been clarified 
to a degree by the decision of the Federal Court of Appeal in 
Pfizer v. Ranbaxy, … which held that, for a selection 
patent, the patentee need not disclose anything more than 
the surprising and unexpected advantage of the selection. 
No data or other evidence to the [sic] support that assertion 
is required to be published within the patent. Suffice it to 
say, though, that when a patentee is attempting to establish 
the utility of a selection by relying upon evidence of sound 
prediction, there may be an obligation to disclose in the 
patent the underlying facts and the line of reasoning which 
support the prediction… 
It seems to me that if a patentee is relying on sound 
prediction to establish that its selection has some 
unexpected advantage over the genus, it does have a 
heightened obligation to disclose in the patent its line of 
reasoning because that is part of the quid pro quo for the 
claimed monopoly over the selection.[Emphasis added]75  
 
XI 
SUFFICIENCY AND AMBIGUITY 
Subsections 27(3)(a) and (b) of the Act set out the sufficiency 
requirement:  
 
Specification. - The specification of an invention must 
(a) correctly and fully describe the invention and its 
operation or use as contemplated by the inventor;  
(b) set out clearly the various steps in a process, or the 
method of constructing making, compounding or 
using a machine manufacture or composition of 
matter, in such full, clear, concise and exact terms as 
to enable any person skilled in the art or science to 
which it pertains, or with which it is most closely 
connected to make, construct, compound or use it;   
 
Subsection 53(1) also deals with the requirements of the 
specification, but includes an element of intent to mislead on the part 
of the applicant: 
                                                          





A patent is void if any material allegation in the petition of 
the applicant in respect of the patent is untrue, or if the 
specification and drawings contain more or less than is 
necessary for obtaining the end for which they purport to 
be made, and the omission or addition is wilfully made for 
the purpose of misleading.  
 
The statutory basis for objecting to claims for ambiguity can be 
found in subsection 27(4) of the Act:  
 
Claims. – The specification must end with a claim or claims 
defining distinctly and in explicit terms the subject-matter 
of the invention for which an exclusive privilege or 
property is claimed.  
 
Sufficiency and ambiguity are two different objections and the 
standard to meet in each case is different:  
 
Canadian courts have stated in a number of cases the test to 
be applied in determining whether disclosure is complete. 
The applicant must disclose everything that is essential for 
the invention to function properly. To be complete, it must 
meet two conditions: it must describe the invention and 
define the way it is produced or built...The applicant must 
define the nature of the invention and describe how it is put 
into operation. A failure to meet the first condition would 
invalidate the application for ambiguity, while a failure to 
meet the second invalidates it for insufficiency.[Emphasis 
added]76  
 
The distinction has also been stated thus:  
 
Insufficiency is directed to whether the specification is 
sufficient to enable a person skilled in the art to understand 
how the subject matter of the patent is to be made; 
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ambiguity is directed to the issue as to whether the scope of 
the monopoly can be understood.77  
 
Ambiguity has been described as a “last resort” and rarely to 
be used. A Court should not find a claim ambiguous where it can be 
construed in a meaningful way.78  
The Supreme Court described the sufficiency requirement in 
Consolboard: 
 
Section 36 of the Patent Act lies at the heart of the whole 
patent system. The description of the invention therein 
provided for is the quid pro quo for which the inventor is 
given a monopoly for a limited term of years on the 
invention.…The consideration for the grant is twofold: 
"first, there must be a new and useful invention, and 
secondly, the inventor, must, in return for the grant of a 
patent, give to the public an adequate description of the 
invention with sufficiently complete and accurate details as 
will enable a workman, skilled in the art to which the 
invention relates, to construct or use that invention when 
the period of the monopoly has expired".79 
 
Insufficiency is a technical attack that should not operate to 
defeat a patent for a meritorious invention, but the attack will succeed 




SUFFICIENCY AND AMBIGUITY AND SELECTION PATENTS 
In Eli Lilly Canada Inc. v. Novopharm Ltd.81, Hughes J. found 
allegations that a selection patent was invalid justified on the basis of 
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insufficiency.82  Eli Lilly brought an application to prohibit the 
Minister of Health from issuing a NOC to Novopharm in respect of 
tablets for oral administration of drugs containing certain dosages of 
olanzapine, marketed by Eli Lilly as ZYPREXA. In its Notice of 
Allegation, Novopharm alleged invalidity of Canadian patent 
2,041,113 (the “113 Patent”). This patent for olanzapine was a 
selection with respect to Canadian patent 1,075,687, which disclosed a 
vast number of compounds (15 trillion).  
The validity of the 113 Patent had previously been considered 
in another application under the PM(NOC) Regulations brought in 
response to a Notice of Allegation issued by Apotex. In this previous 
application, Gauthier J. granted an order of prohibition, finding that 
the allegations made by Apotex in respect to the issue of validity of 
the 113 Patent were not justified.83 In the earlier decision, the grounds 
of invalidity raised were anticipation, obviousness, double patenting 
and an allegation of misleading description under section 53 of the 
Act. Hughes J. considered that there were two invalidity issues raised 
beyond those considered by Gauthier J.: sufficiency and utility.84  
The claims at issue recited the chemical formula for 
olanzapine, along with a use and composition thereof. Hughes J. 
summarized the construction of the claims provided by Gauthier J. as 
follows:  
 
Thus, the construction put on the claims by Justice Gauthier 
was that they were directed to olanzapine as an 
antipsychotic agent, that, in a clinical situation, had a better 
overall profile than previously known antipsychotic agents 
(including those of the „687 Patent) because of a number of 
factors, at least five, and possibly six if cholesterol levels 
were included as a factor. She found no need to determine if 
cholesterol levels were essential for the purposes of 
constructions when addressing the reason of obviousness.85    
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Hughes J. agreed with Gauthier J.‟s findings with respect to 
anticipation, obviousness and double patenting. Turning to the issue 
of sufficiency, Hughes J. considered that the general jurisprudence as 
to sufficiency of disclosure had to be considered in light of the 
particular requirements of selection patents:  
 
The question of sufficiency of disclosure when it comes to 
the selection patents…has particular importance. The 
general jurisprudence as to sufficiency of disclosure must be 
considered in light of the particular requirements respecting 
selection patents that the inventive feature of selection of a 
compound or group of compounds from a larger group must 
reside in the unexpected or surprising attributes of the 
selected compound or groups and that this inventive feature 
must be clearly set out in the specification. [Emphasis 
added]86 
 
Hughes J. identified the discussion of Dickson J. in the 
Supreme Court decision of Consolboard, with respect to disclosure of 
the utility in the specification as giving rise to difficulties when 
considering a selection patent. In particular, the statement that it is a 
requirement that an invention possess utility, but that the patentee is 
not required in the disclosure to describe in what way the invention is 
new or to extol the effect or advantage thereof.87   
Interestingly, Hughes J. went on to cite the following passage 
in Pioneer Hi-Bred where the Supreme Court distinguished the 
difference between ambiguity and utility:  
 
…The applicant must disclose everything that is essential 
for the invention to function properly. To be complete, it 
must meet two conditions: it must describe the invention 
and define the way it is produced or built ... The applicant 
must define the nature of the invention and describe how it 
is put into operation. A failure to meet the first condition 
would invalidate the application for ambiguity, while a 
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failure to meet the second invalidates it for 
insufficiency…[Citations omitted]88  
 
Hughes J. held that mere statement of advantage was 
insufficient:  
 
A patentee cannot merely state that the selected compound 
or group has advantages. The patentee must state clearly 
what the invention is, namely the specific advantages…89 
 
However, it is difficult to ascertain from the decision what 
amounts to a “clear statement” such as to render the patent disclosure 
sufficient.  
Hughes J. however appears to commingle the issue of 
sufficiency with ambiguity:  
 
The discussion as to sufficiency elsewhere in those Reasons 
is directed to whether the patentee put enough into the 
specification so as to enable a person skilled in the art to 
clearly identify and understand the invention. Intention so 
as to deliberately mislead is not an element in considering 
sufficiency. [Emphasis added]90 
 
As discussed above, the requirement to identify the invention 
is not an issue of sufficiency, but of ambiguity.   
In fact, failure to clearly define the advantage (or, 
alternatively stated, to define the inventive concept) as giving rise to 
an ambiguity problem was recognized as long ago as in Re IG 
Farbenindustrie AG: 
 
I must add a word on the subject of the drafting of the 
specification of such a patent. It should be obvious, after 
what I have said as to the essence of the inventive step, that 
it is necessary for the patentee to define in clear terms the 
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nature of the characteristic which he alleges to be possessed 
by the selection for which he claims a monopoly. He has in 
truth disclosed no invention whatever if he merely says that 
the selected group possesses advantages. Apart altogether 
from the question of what is called sufficiency, he must 
disclose an invention; he fails to do this in the case of a 
selection for special characteristics, if he does not 
adequately define them. The cautions repeatedly expressed 
in the House of Lords as regards ambiguity, have, I think, 
special weight in relation to selections patents… [Emphasis 
added]91 
 
Support for the proposition that insufficiency may not be the 
most appropriate ground on which to challenge a patent for “improper 
selection” can be found in the decision of Pfizer Canada Inc. v. Canada 
(Minister of Health)92 (referred to here as Pfizer v. Ranbaxy to 
distinguish it from other cases with Pfizer in the style of cause). The 
Federal Court of Appeal considered the decision of the Applications 
Judge finding allegations of invalidity of a selection patent justified 
based on lack of sufficiency. The case involved a selection patent for 
the selection from a genus patent to cholesterol lowering statin 
compounds. The selection patent claimed pharmaceutically acceptable 
salts of atorvastatin, including the calcium salt marketed under the 
brand name LIPITOR.93 The Notice of Allegation alleged invalidity for 
obviousness, double patenting, insufficiency and anticipation.  
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Citing Consolboard, Nadon J. for the Court of Appeal noted 
that subsection 27(3) of the Act does not require a patent to describe 
its advantages.94 However, Nadon J. noted that the Federal Court had 
approved on a number of occasions of the statement of Lord Diplock 
in the selection case of Beecham Group Ltd. v. Bristol Laboratories 
International S.A.95 that “the quid pro quo for the monopoly granted 
to the inventor is the public disclosure by him in his specification of 
the special advantages that the selected members of the class 
possess”.96 While noting commentary suggesting that the disclosure 
requirements may be a bit more onerous for selection patents, Nadon 
J. also noted that the Court had considered selection patents in only 
two cases and it did not in either case suggest a higher level of 
disclosure was required.97  
Nadon J. went on to characterize the challenges made by 
Ranbaxy to the validity of the patent: 
 
Ranbaxy challenges the promise made by Pfizer in the 546 
patent that atorvastatin displays unexpected and surprising 
increase in activity over the racemate. It does so by 
attacking the reliability of the data that underlies this 
promise.98  
 
Ranbaxy alleged the data provided in the patent description 
was not representative of all the data collected by Pfizer and was 
unreliable and that more reliable data obtained by Pfizer, but not 
supportive of the inventive advantage, was not included within the 
description. Nadon J. then found that such allegations were not 
properly characterized as allegations of insufficiency:  
 
                                                                                                                                  
Barnes J.‟s decision does not explicitly address whether “invalid selection” is a stand 
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These allegations, although placed under a heading entitled 
"sufficiency" in the NOA, have, in my respectful view, 
nothing to do with the disclosure requirement under 
subsection 27(3) of the Act. Rather, they are relevant to an 
analysis of the utility, novelty and/or obviousness of a 
patent. This is clear from the first paragraph of the NOA 
cited above, according to which "[t]he disclosure does not 
support there being any novel or inventive aspect as 
claimed". What Ranbaxy is really challenging in its NOA 
under the heading of "sufficiency" is the fact that Pfizer 
obtained a selection patent without having provided 
reliable data showing that the narrow class of compounds 
selected was better than the compounds covered by the 
genus patent.99 [Emphasis added] 
 
The Court held that the Applications Judge had wrongly 
interpreted the disclosure requirements of subsection 27(3) of the Act:  
 
The Applications Judge was wrong in interpreting the 
disclosure requirement of subsection 27(3) of the Act as 
requiring that a patentee back up his invention by data. By 
so doing, he confused the requirements that an invention be 
new, useful and non-obvious with the requirement under 
subsection 27(3) that the specification disclose the "use" to 
which the inventor conceived the invention could be put: 
see Consolboard, supra, at 527. Whether or not a patentee 
has obtained enough data to substantiate its invention is, in 
my view, an irrelevant consideration with respect to the 
application of subsection 27(3). An analysis thereunder is 
concerned with the sufficiency of the disclosure, not the 
sufficiency of the data underlying the invention. Allowing 
Ranbaxy to attack the utility, novelty and/or obviousness of 
the 546 patent through the disclosure requirement unduly 
broadens the scope of an inventor's obligation under 
subsection 27(3) and disregards the purpose of this 
provision.100  
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The Court characterized the standard to be applied under 
subsection 27(3) as follows:  
 
Only two questions are relevant for the purpose of 
subsection 27(3) of the Act. What is the invention? How 
does it work?: see Consolboard, supra, at 520. In the case of 
selection patents, answering the question "What is the 
invention?" involves disclosing the advantages conferred by 
the selection. If the patent specification (disclosure and 
claims) answers these questions, the inventor has held his 
part of the bargain. In the case at bar, the 546 patent 
answers each of these questions. 
What is the invention? The invention consists of having 
identified an enantiomer, and in particular the calcium salt 
of that enantiomer, that is better at inhibiting the 
biosynthesis of cholesterol than would be expected, given 
the common knowledge and prior art at the time of 
application for the patent.  
How does it work? The 546 patent sets out the methods for 
producing the compounds covered by the patent.101  
 
Nadon J. went on to conclude that the fact that there was no 
disclosure of a justification for why the calcium salt of atorvastatin 
was the preferred embodiment did not render the disclosure 
insufficient:  
 
When read as a whole, a skilled reader would understand 
the patent as claiming that the calcium salt of atorvastatin is 
the compound covered by the 546 patent that demonstrates 
the most surprising and unexpected inhibition of 
cholesterol biosynthesis because it has the most preferred 
physical properties. Pfizer was not required to include in 
the 546 patent data which supports its statement that the 
calcium salt of atorvastatin is the preferred embodiment of 
the invention, nor was it required to explain why the 
calcium salt was the preferred embodiment.102  
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The Court noted that the requirement to be truthful and not 
misleading is not covered by subsection 27(3), but subsection 53(1) of 
the Act.103   
Nadon J. went on to note that Ranbaxy had not challenged the 
sufficiency of the data underlying the invention under the headings of 
obviousness, double patenting or anticipation and the Notice of 
Allegation was therefore insufficient to challenge the patent on this 
basis.   
Nadon J. did not exclude the possibility that a lack of data to 
support a claimed advantage could form the basis of a validity 
challenge:  
 
An attack on a selection patent on the basis that there is no 
data to support the claimed advantage is certainly relevant 
for the purposes of validity (most likely to the question of 
utility), but it is not relevant with respect to disclosure 
under subsection 27(3) of the Act.104  
 
XIII 
SELECTION PATENTS AND THE SOUND PREDICTION ANALYSIS 
The Federal Court recently considered the ZYPREXA patent 
again in the context of an infringement action brought by Eli Lilly 
against Novopharm.105 This decision is currently under appeal. 
Novopharm attacked the patent on a number of grounds including 
anticipation, double-patenting, and obviousness. O‟Reilly J. purported 
to make his decision based on a ground of invalidity that he described 
as “invalid selection”.106 A review of the reasons for decision, however, 
reveals a utility analysis made with respect to the advantage(s) of the 
selected compound.  
O‟Reilly J. identified a three step analysis:  
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Therefore, the first step I must take is to decide whether 
one or more of the asserted advantages of olanzapine was 
known to exist, or was soundly predicted, at the time the 
'113 patent was filed in 1991. Second, I must decide 
whether at least one of them could be considered a 
substantial advantage over the '687 compounds and 
somewhat peculiar to olanzapine. And, if so, the third 
question is whether the disclosure of that substantial and 
special advantage in the '113 patent was adequate. If I 
decide any one of them in the negative, I must find the '113 
patent to be invalid.107 
 
O‟Reilly J. identified from the patent four advantages relative 
to the compounds of the genus 687 Patent and, in particular, 
flumezapine and ethyl olanzapine, for which comparative data was 
provided in the 113 Patent.108  Interestingly, O‟Reilly J. went on to 
identify additional advantages in respect of “prior known 
antipsychotic agents”, noting that flumezapine and ethyl olanzapine 
had not been “used for the treatment of schizophrenia or any other 
condition”: 
 
In my view, reading the '113 patent as a whole, the skilled 
reader, aware of the '687 patent, would interpret the alleged 
superiority of olanzapine over other antipsychotic drugs on 
the market as being another major advantage of olanzapine 
over the other '687 compounds.109  
 
With respect to prior known antipsychotic agents, O‟Reilly J. 
identified four specific comparisons.110  
                                                          
107 Ibid. at 18.  
108 Ibid. at 17 [(i) has lower elevations of liver enzymes than flumezapine, (ii) lower 
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does not elevate cholesterol; but ethyl olanzapine does.]. 
109 Ibid. at 17-18.  
110 Ibid. [(i) high level of efficacy at low doses; (ii) lower elevation of prolactin; (iii) 




In the first step of the analysis - deciding whether one or more 
of the asserted advantages of olanzapine was known to exist, or was 
soundly predicted - a sound prediction analysis (a utility analysis) was 
made of each of the advantages identified. O‟Reilly J. found there was 
a lack of factual basis for each advantage or a prediction thereof, or a 
sound line of reasoning from which the advantage could be soundly 
predicted from the facts provided.  
In the second step of the analysis, O‟Reilly J. considered the 
question of whether at least one advantage could be considered a 
substantial advantage over the genus compounds and somewhat 
peculiar to olanzapine. O‟Reilly J. held the comparisons made “did not 
relate to the class as a whole” and that he had “no evidence that any 
advantage was peculiar to olanzapine.”111 Clearly with a genus patent 
of 15 trillion compounds, comparative data across the class would be 
impossible. O‟Reilly J. seemed to place significance on the 
comparisons in the 113 patent being made to “failed compounds”,112 
although this hardly seems significant given that the selection is from 
a genus of “unselected” compounds.  
O‟Reilly J. adopted something akin to a utility analysis under 
this step of the analysis:  
 
The invention described in the '687 patent was a class of 
compounds that would be useful in the treatment of 
psychotic conditions and acute mania, and that would have 
low EPS liability. By contrast, the invention described in 
the '113 patent is a drug that is safer and more effective in 
the clinical treatment of patients than other antipsychotic 
drugs on the market. This is clearly a substantial advantage 
that would set olanzapine apart from the rest of the '687 
class. However, as outlined above, the broad assertion in the 
'113 patent was unsupportable at the time Lilly applied for 
it.113 
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The advantage would only be incapable of support (i.e. would 
be unsupportable) if it was not demonstrated or predictable at the 
time the application was applied for (i.e. if it the test for utility could 
not be satisfied.)  
Under the third step of the analysis, O‟Reilly J. identified two 
disclosure obligations: the duty to set out the basis on which 
olanzapine is believed to have a substantial and peculiar advantage 
over the 687 compounds and the duty to set out the basis for the 
sound prediction for that advantage. O‟Reilly J. found the two 
disclosure requirements to be “coextensive” and not satisfied.114  
It is interesting to contrast the outcome in this case with that 
of a recent United Kingdom (UK) Court of Appeal decision where the 
corresponding patent for ZYPREXA was upheld.115 The patent was 
challenged for anticipation and obviousness over a prior Eli Lilly 
specification that disclosed the genus and also for obviousness in view 
of a piece of non-patent prior art. Eli Lilly also sought to defend the 
patent as a valid “selection patent”. Considering the law of selection 
patents as laid down in I.G. Farbenindustrie‟s Patents,116  the Court 
relegated these rules to old law.117 The Master of the Rolls noted that 
the 1977 UK Patent Act “was expressly enacted to create a “new” 
regime for patents” and was “intended to be interpreted in accordance 
with the EPC”.118 Noting that selection patent rules from I.G. 
Farbenindustrie‟s Patents did not form part of the European Patent 
Office (EPO) Guidelines for Examination and had not been applied in 
an EPO Board of Appeal decision cited to them, Lord Justice Jacob in a 
concurring decision held them no longer part of UK patent law.119   
The Court adopted an obviousness approach based on the 
practice of the EPO Boards when analyzing claims for a product or 
class of products falling within a greater class.120  
Lord Justice Jacob characterized the standard applied by the 
EPO:  
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What then does the EPO do? The answer is essentially this: 
that it regards what can fairly be regarded as a mere 
arbitrary selection from a class as obvious. If there is no 
more than an arbitrary selection then there is simply no 
technical contribution provided by the patentee.121  
While the Master of the Rolls noted that in some cases the 
Board had indicated that a selection patent must show that the 
selected compound has an advantage which other compounds do not 
have, the requirement can be satisfied by comparing the claimed 
compound with the closest prior art, i.e. structurally the most similar 
compound in the group from which the claimed compound has been 
selected.122 
The Court rejected the proposition that the selection of 
olanzapine was arbitrary and held the patent not obvious in view of 
the genus specification.123 
 Lord Justice Jacob noted the trial Judge‟s conclusion that if it 
been necessary to shown compliance with the I.G. Farbenindustrie‟s 
Patents rules, the patent failed to do so, but observed that this showed 
that the rules were too strict:  
 
It shows, to my mind, that the rules are too strict. They 
would mean that a technical advance of the sort made by 
Lilly would be unpatentable. That in turn would mean that 
it would not be worthwhile doing the sort of thing that 
Lilly did by developing the disclosure of their Patent 
further and bringing olanzapine to market. Unpatentability 
would have meant this medicine would not have been 
available.124  
 
In the Canadian case, O‟Reilly J. also considered the question 
of inventiveness, but came to a different conclusion.125 O‟Reilly J. did 
not conclude “that the selection of olanzapine as a development 
compound was an obvious choice” noting that “olanzapine was not 
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the only candidate under consideration, and did not even appear to be 
particularly active” and it “was not "more or less self-evident" that 
olanzapine would work.”126 However, he found the testing of 
olanzapine to be “routine”:  
 
Lilly had merely carried out routine testing of olanzapine's 
properties. It had some early signals of safety and efficacy in 
a few small studies of healthy volunteers and patients. Lilly 
scientists showed persistence, diligence and sound science 
in getting olanzapine that far. New methods of synthesis 
had to be worked out (after an explosion in the lab during 
synthesis of flumezapine). But that is not enough for a 
patent. There must be an invention. And, in the context of a 
selection patent, the invention is the discovery of 
unexpected, substantial and special advantages. 127 
 
In an introductory portion of his decision, O‟Reilly J. 
described the development of olanzapine in the years following the 
1975 filing of the genus 687 Patent. Testing on ethyl flumezapine was 
wound down in 1978 and clinical trials on flumezapine were halted in 
1982 after receiving reports of elevated liver enzymes and the muscle 
enzyme CPK in some patients. Olanzapine was first synthesized 
shortly after the discontinuation of flumezapine. O‟Reilly J. noted that 
at first olanzapine was not considered by all researchers to be a good 
choice for development and testing was ongoing until filing of the 
patent application in 1983.128 He summarized the testing that had 
been performed at the time of filing:  
 
By the time it filed the '113 patent, Lilly had received the 
results of its healthy volunteer studies, as well as some 
preliminary data from its clinical trials. It had also 
concluded a six-month study in dogs. The patent mentions 
these studies and provides some general information about 
what they disclosed.129  
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If the choice of olanzapine was not obvious, characterizing the 
years of product development as entirely routine so as to make a 
finding of obviousness would seem to be a high standard to apply.  
The stringency with which the sound prediction standard is 
applied (if at all) will influence the result in this type of decision. 
Particularly in a case such as ZYPREXA, where a selection is made 
from an enormous genus and the selection has merit, it would seem 
appropriate to have some deference to the expertise of the applicant in 
making the selection based on the testing performed. In this regard, 
the patenting of arbitrary choices for which there is no evidence to 
predict advantageous properties over the genus would clearly be 
precluded by practical considerations. Also, given that “the same 
rules” are to apply to selection patents, the broad definition of utility 
from Consolboard, which includes affording the public a useful choice 
could still be relevant.130 In the ZYPREXA context, identifying a 
compound from a vast class and demonstrating its clinical potential in 
early clinical trials arguably affords the public a new and useful 
choice, while requiring proof of a superior side effects profile and 




The Supreme Court decision of Sanofi-Synthelabo established 
the tests to be applied in assessing the novelty and inventiveness of a 
selection patent. The decision clarified that in the case of a true 
selection, there is no anticipation because the genus patent will not 
satisfy the disclosure requirement of the anticipation test. In the case 
of obviousness, the inventive concept of the claims may be ascertained 
with reference to the specification. The inventive concept can be 
found in the special advantage of the selected compound. With respect 
to double patenting, if the claims of a selection patent are novel and 
inventive over the genus patent, the patent will not be invalid for 
double patenting: the claims are not to the same invention, the claims 
of the genus patent are broader than those of the selection patent. If 
the inventive concept or advantage cannot be ascertained, there is no 
inventive concept and the patent may be invalid for obviousness. An 
                                                          




inability to ascertain the inventive concept of a claim presumably also 
means such a claim would be invalid for ambiguity. If the invention 
does not fulfil the “promise” of the selection patent (i.e. the stated 
advantage), it may be invalid for lack of utility. Testing and evidence 
thereof may be required where the patentee is relying on sound 
prediction to establish that its selection has some unexpected 
advantage over the genus; however, this proposition is presently under 
appeal.  An allegation of improper selection can be considered mere 
“shorthand” for alleging one of the existing applicable grounds of 
invalidity. Clearly identifying, expressing and assessing these grounds 
of invalidity could lead to more doctrinal clarity and jurisprudential 
development of these existing grounds, while ensuring that selection 
patents continue to be subject to the same rules that apply to other 
types of patents.  
 
